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WILLIAMS-YULEE V. FLoRIDA BAR: JUDICIAL ELECTIONS,
IMPARTIALITY, AND THE THREAT TO FREE SPEECH
ABSTRACT

Judicial elections have been controversial for many years. The debate surrounding them has heightened as spending in judicial elections
has increased in recent years. Critics of judicial elections fear that the
electoral process compromises judicial impartiality and independence.
Supporters argue that such fears are overblown and that democratically
elected judiciaries are superior to ones appointed by other branches of
government.
Some states have attempted to regulate judicial elections in order to
preserve the appearance and reality of judicial impartiality. In particular,
states have sought to limit the content of judicial candidates' speech during elections. Until recently, the Court has not favored such efforts.
However, in Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, the Court for the first time
upheld a state's regulation on judicial candidates' speech during an election, holding that Florida's ban on direct financial solicitation from a
judicial candidate does not violate the First Amendment.
This Comment argues that, while preserving the appearance and reality of judicial impartiality is necessary to ensure a respected and just
judiciary, the Court should not have allowed Florida's ban on direct
campaign solicitation by judicial candidates to stand. This Comment
argues that the ban violates the First Amendment and that the Court's
holding runs against long-standing principles of freedom of speech in
elections. Further, this Comment argues that states should appoint their
judiciaries. However, such reform is politically unlikely, and therefore
states should at least consider reforming their judicial recusal procedures
to improve the appearance and reality of judicial impartiality.

551

552

DENVER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:2

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION
I. BACKGROUND

....................................................
...................................................

A. FirstAmendment Speech Theory andAnalysis ......
B. JudicialElections and Recent Case Law ...........

......
.....
............
......

552
553

553
555
560
560
560
560
563
563
564
565
565

II. WILLIAMS-YULEE V. FLORIDA BAR...............
A. Facts
...................................
B. ProceduralHistory.............................
C. Opinion of the Court ...................
...........
D. Justice Breyer's Concurring Opinion........................
E. Justice Ginsburg's ConcurringOpinion ............
.....
F. Justice Scalia's Dissenting Opinion............
.............
G. Justice Kennedy's Dissenting Opinion ............
......
H. Justice Alito's Dissenting Opinion ....................
III. ANALYSIS
................................................
565
A. JudicialElections Compromise the Role of the Judiciary.......... 567
B. The Court Should Not Abridge FirstAmendment Principles to
Achieve JudicialImpartiality and Independence......
..... 569
C. Recusal as a Speech-ProtectingOption in MaintainingJudicial
Impartiality
........................................
572
D. The Best Way to PreserveJudicialImpartiality andIndependence
Is to Advocate for Lifetime JudicialAppointment, but Politics Gets
in the Way
..............................
....... 574
CONCLUSION

...................................................

576

INTRODUCTION

Judicial elections are not new to this country,' but they have been
the subject of criticism for over one hundred years. 2 In particular, critics
have suggested that judicial elections compromise the appearance and
reality of judicial impartiality and independence by pressuring judges to
cater their rulings to please the public and their campaigns' financial
contributors. 3 Further, the presence of increasing amounts of money in
judicial elections4 only makes this pressure more intense, and judges can
appear biased in favor of financial contributors when those persons or
groups appear before them in court. Prominent members of the Court
have advocated putting an end to judicial elections,6 but thus far state
1. See Michael R. Dimino, Pay No Attention to That Man Behind the Robe: Judicial Elections, the FirstAmendment, and Judges as Politicians,21 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 301,310 (2003).
2.
Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 791 (2002) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
3. See, e.g., id. at 789-90.
4. James J. Sample et al., The New Politics of Judicial Elections, 94 Judicature 50, 51-52
(2010).
5.
White, 536 U.S. at 788-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
6. See, e.g., id. at 788-92.
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governments and bar associations have sought to limit the influence of
the electorate on the judiciary through other means.7 Most troublingly,
states have sought to limit what judges can and cannot say while campaigning to maintain the ideal nature and image of the judiciary.8
Until recently, the Court has been suspect of speech restrictions in
judicial elections and has generally upheld the rights of judicial candidates to engage in all forms of campaign speech. 9 With its decision in
Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar,10 the Court for the first time upheld a
state's restriction on judicial campaign speech, specifically Florida's ban
on direct solicitation of money by judicial candidates." The Court held
that Florida's restrictions are permitted under the First Amendment to
preserve a state's compelling interest in judicial impartiality and independence.1 2 This Comment will begin with an overview of the Court's
First Amendment theory and analysis and provide a brief history of judicial elections. Next, this Comment will review the Court's recent decisions surrounding judicial elections and provide a description of the
Court's opinion in Williams-Yulee. This Comment will then argue that,
while the appearance and reality of judicial impartiality is necessary to a
properly functioning judiciary and should be preserved, the Court should
not undermine fundamental First Amendment principles in preserving
judicial impartiality. The most effective way to preserve judicial impartiality would be to end judicial elections, but this solution is unlikely in
the current political climate. Therefore, this Comment will explore alternative solutions, such as reforming judicial recusal procedures.
I. BACKGROUND

A. FirstAmendment Speech Theory and Analysis
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states: "Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press . ...
This Amendment generally affords people the right to express their views regardless of the content of those views. 14 The right to
free speech has been considered especially important when speech is
political in nature.1 5 The latter proposition derives its support from one of
the principle theories offered as justification for freedom of speech: self-

7.

See id. at 768-69 (majority opinion); see also Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556

U.S. 868, 888-90 (2009).
8.
See White, 536 U.S. at 768-69.
9.
See id. at 776-77.
10.
135 S. Ct 1656 (2015).
11. Id at 1662.
12.
Id at 1665.
13.
U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
14.
See Willians-Yulee, 135 S. Ct at 1682-83 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Police Dep't of Chi.
v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972).
Monitor PatriotCo. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971) (stating the First Amendment has its
15.
"fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office").
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governance. This theory holds that freedom of speech is essential to
democracy and representative government.17 In order for democracy to
function properly, candidates and citizens must be able to speak openly
about political issues.18 First Amendment scholar Alexander Meiklejohn 9 wrote that "[s]elf-govemment can exist only insofar as the voters acquire the intelligence, integrity, sensitivity, and generous devotion
to the general welfare that, in theory, casting a ballot is assumed to express." 20 For this reason, Meiklejohn argued that any public speech affecting the issues of self-governance could not be regulated by the government. 21
Despite its broad language, the First Amendment does not prevent
the government from regulating any speech. 22 To determine if a government regulation of speech violates the First Amendment, the Court must
decide if the law in question regulates speech based on its content or if
the law is "content-neutral."23 If the law regulates speech based on its
content, then it is considered "presumptively invalid,"24 and the government must meet the judicial standard of strict scrutiny to justify the regulation.25
Strict scrutiny is the most demanding standard of judicial review, 26
and laws typically do not survive its application. 27 To be upheld under

16.
See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 954-57
(4th ed. 2011); KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 6-7 (2d ed.

2003).
17.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at 954; SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 16, at 6-7.
18.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at 954.
19.
Alexander Meiklejohn (1872-1964) was a philosopher and a staunch advocate for free
speech. Eugene Cerruti, "Dancing in the Courthouse": The FirstAmendment Right ofAccess Opens

a New Round, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 237, 284-85 (1995). Meiklejohn is considered to be a "seminal
figure" in First Amendment theory. Id. at 283; see also Joseph Russomanno, The "Central Meaning" and Path Dependence: The Madison-Meiklejohn-BrennanNexus, 20 COMM. L. & POL'Y 117,

128 (2015) ("Alexander Meiklejohn is the 'father of modem [F]irst [A]mendment theory."' (alteration in original) (quoting Richard A. Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, 53 U. CHI.

L. REV. 782, 782 (1986))); Robert Post, Meiklejohn 's Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform
ofPublic Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1111 (1993).
20.
Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REv. 245,
255.
21.

ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 24-

26(1948).
22.
Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961) ("[W]e reject the view that freedom of speech and association, as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, are 'absolutes,' not only in the undoubted sense that where the constitutional protection exists it must prevail,
but also in the sense that the scope of that protection must be gathered solely from a literal reading of

the First Amendment." (citation omitted)); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) ("The
most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre
and causing a panic. It does not even protect a man from an injunction against uttering words that
may have all the effect of force.").

23.
Tumer Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FEC, 512 U.S. 622, 642-43 (1994).
24.
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
25.
United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000); see also Turner, 512
U.S. at 641.
26.

CHEMERINSKY, supranote 16, at 554.
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strict scrutiny, the Court must find the law necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose.28 In order for the law to be "necessary," it
must be the least restrictive means of accomplishing the government's
purpose.29 The Court has frequently stated that a law must be "narrowly
tailored" to be the least restrictive means of achieving a government purpose. 30 In determining if a law is narrowly tailored, the Court considers
the extent to which the law is underinclusive or overinclusive. In the
context of free speech analysis, a law is underinclusive if it does not apply to all speech that is connected to the government's purpose in enacting the law. 32 A law is overinclusive if it applies to speech not connected
to the government's purpose in enacting the law.
Importantly, the Court has held that the First Amendment does not
protect the speech of government employees made in the scope of their
professional duties.34 In Garcetti v. Ceballos," the Court held that "when
public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the
employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes,
and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline." 36 However, the First Amendment does protect the
speech of government employees when their speech is made "as a citizen" and addresses "matters of public concern." 37
B. JudicialElections and Recent Case Law
Judicial elections have been the subject of serious debate since the
founding of this nation. In Article III of the U.S. Constitution, the
Founders chose to insulate the federal judiciary from the electorate by
having the President appoint judges for life, subject to confirmation by
the Senate.39 The Founders thought the differing roles of judges and oth27.
Id.; see also Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) (describing strict
scrutiny as 'strict' in theory and fatal in fact").

28. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995); Sugarman v. Dougall,
413 U.S. 634, 643 (1973).
29.

CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at 554.

30.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of
N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118 (1991); Ark. Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481
U.S. 221, 231 (1987).
31.
32.

CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at 689-90.
See Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L.

REV. 341, 349-51 (1949) (discussing the concept of underinclusivity generally).
33.

See id at 351 (discussing overinclusivity generally).

34.

Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 426 (2006). For a discussion of the importance of this

holding, see infra Section III.B.

35.
36.
37.
38.

547 U.S. 410 (2006).
Id. at 421.
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Cty., Ill., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1672-73 (2015); Philip L. Dubois, Account-

ability, Independence, and the Selection of State Judges: The Role of PopularJudicialElections, 40

Sw. L.J. 31, 34-37 (1986); Peter D. Webster, Selection and Retention of Judges: Is There One
"Best " Method?, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1995).
39.

Dimino, supra note 1, at 306-10.
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er politicians to be essential to the functioning of the federal government,
and maintaining judicial independence and impartiality is considered
"the foundational principle-of Article III."4o Further, the Founders
thought that a judiciary independent of the voting public was essential to
the protection of minority viewpoints from a possibly tyrannical majority.41 In The FederalistNo. 78, Alexander Hamilton stated the following:
This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the
Constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill
humors which the arts of designing men, or the influence of particular conjunctures, sometimes disseminate among the people themselves, and which, though they speedily give place to better information, and more deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in the meantime, to occasion dangerous innovations in the government, and serious oppressions of the minor party in the community.42
However, the states were left open to determine how their judges
would be selected, and throughout the nineteenth century, many states
decided on judicial elections.43 While a majority of states have held judicial elections since the early twentieth century, progressive reformers in
the 1920s and 1930s advocated for judicial appointment." In an attempt
to regulate candidate speech in judicial elections, the American Bar Association (ABA) first drafted guidelines for judicial electoral conduct in
1924, and in 1972 the ABA amended its Canons of Judicial Ethics to
prohibit judicial candidates from promising certain conduct during their
time in office or from announcing their personal opinions on legal or
45
political questions. Numerous states adopted the ABA's amended cannons, and these state laws would eventually be challenged as violations
46
of the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech.
In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,47 a group of judicial
candidates and political organizations challenged Minnesota's adoption
40.

Id. at 306.

41.

Scott W. Gaylord, Unconventional Wisdom: The Roberts Court's Proper Support of

Judicial Elections, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1521, 1526. "Tyranny of the majority" is a term used to
describe the oppression of minority groups and viewpoints by a majority in a democracy. LANI
GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY 1-3 (1994). Majority tyranny can arise in heterogeneous
democratic societies where the majority cannot be said to represent the interests of the entire populous. Id. at 3 ("The majority is likely to be . . . indifferent to the concerns of the minority."). "The
tyranny of the majority, according to [James] Madison, requires safeguards to protect 'one part of
the society against the injustice of the other part."' Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James

Madison)).
42.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 440 (Alexander Hamilton) (Issac Kramnick ed., 1987).
43.
Gaylord, supra note 41, at 1522; Charles Gardner Geyh, The Endless JudicialSelection
Debate and Why It Matters for Judicial Independence, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1259, 1261-62

(2008) (stating that by 1909 thirty-five states selected their judges by partisan election).
44.
45.

Gaylord, supra note 41, at 1530; see also Geyh, supranote 43, at 1261-62.
Dimino, supra note 1, at 314.

46.

See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 768-70 (2002). A clause

prohibiting judges from announcing their personal opinions on legal or political questions have been
referred to as an "announce clause." Id at 768.

47.

536 U.S. 765 (2002).
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of an "announce clause" 48 as an unconstitutional abridgment of speech
under the First Amendment. 49 The Court ruled the announce clause was
unconstitutional. It reasoned that the clause imposed a restriction on
speech based on its content and that the content in question, the political
viewpoints of candidates, is speech that is afforded the utmost protection
under the First Amendment.50
Further, the Court reasoned that Minnesota failed to meet the burden of strict scrutiny, which requires that a state law or regulation abridging speech protected by the First Amendment be narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling state interest.5 1 The Court held that Minnesota had a
compelling interest in maintaining the impartiality of its judiciary in ap52
pearance and reality. However, the Court also held that the announce
clause was not narrowly tailored to serve that interest because the clause
restricted all speech associated with the particular legal or political views
of the judicial candidates.53
Moreover, the Court held that the possibility of bias resulting from a
judge's preconceived views on legal issues does not violate a litigant's
due process right to an impartial trial.54 The Court reiterated this point by
asserting that a judicial candidate whose mind "was a complete tabula
rasa in the area of constitutional adjudication" would be unfit to serve as
a judge.55 Further, even if Minnesota had characterized its interest as
assuring litigants an "open-minded[]" judge, the announce clause would
still fail under strict scrutiny because a judge's speech during a campaign
is potentially only a small portion of his or her overall speech on political
56
issues. Finally, Justice Kennedy asserted that Minnesota could adequately maintain its interest in judicial impartiality through robust
recusal standards.5 7
The majority opinion in White established that judicial elections
would be held to basically the same First Amendment standards as other
political elections 58 and that a litigant's due process rights are not necessarily infringed by a judge's speech during an election. 59 However,
48.
Id at 769-70. The "announce clause" stated "that a 'candidate for a judicial office, including an incumbent judge,' shall not 'announce his or her views on disputed legal or political issues."'
Id. at 768 (quoting MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2000)). Minnesota's clause
was based on Cannon 7(B) of the 1972 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct. Id.; see MODEL CODE
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B) (AM. BAR Ass'N 1972).

49.

White, 536 U.S. at 773-74.

50.

Gaylord, supra note 41, at 1535.

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

See White, 536 U.S. at 774-77. See generally supraSection I.A.
White, 536 U.S. at 775-76.
Id at 776.
Id at 782-83.
Id at 778 (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 835 (1972)).
See id at 79-80.
Id at 794 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

58.
59.

Dimino, supra note 1, at 318.
See Gaylord, supra note 41, at 1535.
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Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co. 60 provided the Court with an instance
to examine the role of financial contributions in judicial elections. 6 1 The
Court ruled that the due process rights of a litigant can be violated when
an adverse party who financially contributed to a judge's campaign subsequently comes before that judge in a court proceeding.62
In Caperton, Justice Brent Benjamin, a West Virginia appellate
judge, refused to recuse himself from presiding over the appeal of a $50
million verdict against a corporation run by Donald Blankenship, a contributor to Benjamin's judicial campaign.63 The jury verdict against the
corporation was awarded shortly before the 2004 West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals elections, and Blankenship provided more than
$500,000 to Benjamin's campaign through independent expenditures.
Further, Blankenship donated nearly $2.5 million to a political organiza65
tion that supported Benjamin's campaign. These contributions were
greater than the total amount spent by all of Benjamin's other supporters
on the campaign and three times what was spent by Benjamin's own
66
committee.
The Court held that there is a significant "probability of bias" where
''a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a significant and
disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by raising
funds or directing the judge's election campaign when the case was
pending or imminent."67 Further, the Court held that the CEO's contributions rose to the level of being "significant and disproportionate" and that
Justice Benjamin's failure to recuse himself violated Caperton's due process rights to a fair trial.68 The opinion did not rule in any way against
the ability of individuals to contribute financially to judicial elections.
Rather, the opinion established that judicial impartiality could be preserved in extreme cases through the "probability of bias" recusal rule, as
well as through state regulations on judicial conduct. 69

60.
61.

556 U.S. 868 (2009).
Id. at 872.

62.

See Gaylord, supra note 41, at 1539.

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Caperton, 556 U.S. at 873-75.
Id. at 873.
Id.
See id at 873.
Id. at 884.
Id. at 872, 885.
Gaylord, supra note 41, at 1539-40 (quoting Caperton, 556 U.S. at 884); see also Caper-

ton, 556 U.S. at 889-90. The current ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a judge
"shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.11(A) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2010). A
more recent provision requires judges to recuse themselves when they know a party or their attorney
donated money to their campaign, but the actual dollar amount that requires recusal is left for states
to decide. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.1 1(A)(4) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2010). Numerous
states adopting the Model Code have either declined to include Canon 2.11 (A)(4) or have altered the
language significantly. See AM. BAR ASs'N CPR POLCY IMPLEMENTATION COMM., COMPARISON
OF ABA MODEL JUDICIAL CODE AND STATE VARIATIONS (2015) [hereinafter ABA, COMPARISON],
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While Caperton is an illustration of the apparent harm judicial elections can cause to judicial impartiality, the Court's decision in Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission 70drastically heightened many
people's fear that judicial elections inevitably erode judicial integrity in
appearance and actuality.7' In Citizens United, the Court held that the
First Amendment protects the political speech of corporations, including
independent campaign expenditures in all elections, and that Congress
and state legislatures may not censor corporate speech on the basis of its
content. Critics of the decision suggested that this ruling guaranteed
greater financial expenditures in judicial elections because states could
no longer limit corporate spending on those campaigns.73 Therefore, judicial elections could now be "conducted amid unlimited corporate
spending," further destroying the public's confidence in an impartial and
independent judiciary by suggesting that corporations could influence
judicial decision-making through massive campaign contributions. 74
The combined effect of White and Citizens United created the impression that the Court would continue to affirm the First Amendment's
guarantee of free speech in judicial elections over a state's interest in
limiting that speech. While the Court has acknowledged that states have
an interest in preserving judicial impartiality, 76 the Court has been comfortable with preserving that interest through the recusal process alone.
Further, the Court has downplayed the difference between judges and

http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional

responsibility/2_1 L.authc

heckdam.pdf.
70.
558 U.S. 310 (2010).
71.
Gaylord, supra note 41, at 1541-43.
72.
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 342-44, 365.
73.
Gaylord, supra note 41, at 1543.
74.
Id; Paul D. Carrington, Public Funding of Judicial Campaigns: The North Carolina
Experience and the Activism of the Supreme Court, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1965, 1984 (2011); see also
Vernon Valentine Palmer & John Levendis, The Louisiana Supreme Court in Question: An Empirical and Statistical Study of the Effects of Campaign Money on the JudicialFunction, 82 TUL. L.
REV. 1291 (2008) (presenting empirical data demonstrating that campaign contributions influenced
the decisions of the Louisiana Supreme Court when donors appeared before them in court); Adam
Liptak & Janet Roberts, Campaign Cash Mirrorsa High Court's Rulings, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2006,
at Al (presenting evidence that justices on the Ohio Supreme Court voted in favor of campaign
contributors seventy percent of the time).
75.
In White, the Court held that the First Amendment protects judicial campaign speech.

Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002) (holding that Minnesota's restriction
on judicial candidates announcing their views is a violation of the First Amendment). In Citizens
United, the Court held that the First Amendment protects independent expenditures by corporations
in elections. 558 U.S. at 342-44, 365. These cases show the Court's history of supporting free
speech over states' attempts to regulate speech in elections, suggesting that this Court would continue to show support for more electoral speech in future cases.

76.
77.

Gaylord, supra note 41, at 1535 (summarizing the holding of White).
See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 884 (2009) (holding that judicial

recusal is required when "a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a significant and
disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by raising funds or directing the judge's

election campaign when the case was pending or imminent."); White, 536 U.S. at 794 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (stating that states can "adopt recusal standards more rigorous than due process requires,
and censure judges who violate these standards" to protect judicial integrity).
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other elected officials, arguing that both are basically afforded the same
speech rights in campaigns under the First Amendment.78
II. WILLIAMS-YULEE V. FLORIDA BAR
A. Facts
In September 2009, Williams-Yulee campaigned unsuccessfully for
a seat on the county court of Hillsborough County, Florida.79 At the onset
of her campaign, Williams-Yulee drafted and mailed a letter to the public
in which she announced her candidacy and asked for campaign contributions.80 Following the campaign, the Florida Bar brought a complaint
against Williams-Yulee alleging that her letter violated the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar.8 1 The rules require that judicial candidates abide
by the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct, which includes a "ban on personal solicitation of campaign funds." 82 Specifically, Canon 7C(l) states
that judicial candidates "shall not personally solicit campaign funds ...
but may establish committees of responsible persons to secure and manage the expenditure of funds for the candidate's campaign."83 WilliamsYulee did not dispute that she had drafted and signed a letter asking for
campaign contributions.84 Instead, she argued that Canon 7C(l) was a
violation of the First Amendment, which protected her right to solicit
campaign contributions directly.85
B. ProceduralHistory
The Florida Supreme Court appointed a referee to make a recommendation on the case, and the referee determined in a hearing that Williams-Yulee should be found guilty.86 The Florida Supreme Court accepted the referee's determination, ruling that while Canon 7C(l) is a
restriction on speech, the canon met the demands of strict scrutiny as
required by the First Amendment.87 The United States Supreme Court
88
granted certiorari.
C. Opinion of the Court
Chief Justice Roberts authored the opinion of the Court. 89 Justices
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined the Chief Justice in his full opin78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

See White, 536 U.S. at 784.
Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1663 (2015).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1663-64.

83.

Id. at 1663 (quoting FLA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 7C(1) (2014)).

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 1664.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1662.
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ion, and Justice Ginsburg joined him except as to Part 11.90 The Court
affirmed the Florida Supreme Court's ruling, finding that Canon 7C(l)
satisfies the demands of strict scrutiny and is therefore permitted under
the First Amendment. 9 1 Chief Justice Roberts began by holding that the
Court should apply strict scrutiny in this case because the Court has
"long recognized, [that] speech about public issues and the qualifications
of candidates for elected office commands the highest level of First
Amendment protection."92 Further, Chief Justice Roberts reasoned that a
lesser standard of review would be "a poor fit for this case." 93 He stated
that all parties admit that the Canon 7C(1) infringes on Williams-Yulee's
speech based on its content, and therefore the Court must review the law
under strict scrutiny as required by the First Amendment. 94
The Court then considered if Canon 7C(1) met the demands of strict
scrutiny and concluded that it did.95 Chief Justice Roberts asserted that
the Canon was adopted to serve the state's interest in maintaining the
integrity of the judiciary-in appearance and in actuality-and that the
Court's precedents have long recognized such an end as a compelling
"state interest of the highest order." 96 He then declared that, while both
parties spent time comparing Canon 7C(l) to campaign financing restrictions in other types of elections, such comparisons were not warranted because judges serve a different public function than other elected
officials.97 He argued that judges are not to consider their campaign supporters or donors in their rulings. 98 Rather, they are expected to be neutral, evenhanded adjudicators. 99 As a result, he concludes that judicial
elections may be regulated differently from other elections.'0
Further, the Chief Justice stated that the mere possibility of a judge
giving campaign contributors an unfair advantage in judicial proceedings
is enough to justify Florida's enactment of Canon 7C(l).' 0 He reasoned
that when judges directly solicit members of the public and the bar for
campaign money, the result is the "unavoidable appearance" that judges
might no longer perform their duties in an impartial manner.10 2 Moreover, Justice Roberts stated that such solicitation can create a fear amongst

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 1656.
Id. at 1662, 1670.
Id. at 1665.
Id.
Id. at 1664-65.
Id. at 1665-66.
Id (quoting Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 889 (2009)).
Id. at 1667.
Id.
Id
Id.
Id. at 1667-68.
Id. at 1667.
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lawyers and litigants that if they do not contribute to a judge's campaign,
they will suffer a disadvantage in that judge's courtroom.' 0 3
Next, the Chief Justice addressed whether Canon 7C(l) is narrowly
tailored to fit Florida's compelling interest in maintaining judicial integrity.104 He began by addressing Williams-Yulee's argument that Canon
7C(1) is underinclusive because it does not prohibit other potentially
compromising forms of campaign fund solicitation, such as the solicitation by campaign committees and personal thank-you notes written by
judges to their financial contributors.' 0 5 The Chief Justice dismissed this
argument, stating that while underinclusiveness can be problematic for a
law seeking to survive strict scrutiny, the First Amendment has no "freestanding 'underinclusiveness limitation."'l06 Further, he held that states
are not required to eliminate all threats to their compelling interest in a
single action.' 07 Justice Roberts stated that Florida reasonably concluded
that personal campaign solicitations are a greater threat to the appearance
of judicial impartiality than committee solicitations or personal thankyou notes.ios Therefore, he held that Canon 7C(l) does not fail under
strict scrutiny for failing to prohibit other forms of judicial speech.1 09
The Chief Justice then addressed Williams-Yulee's argument that
Canon 7C(l) is unconstitutional because it restricts too much judicial
speech and that it is not the least restrictive means of advancing Florida's
interest." 0 He concluded otherwise, asserting that Canon 7C(l)'s prohibition of personal campaign solicitations by judges is a "narrow slice of
speech""' and that Florida is allowed to regulate personal campaign solicitations by judges in any form in which they might occur.'1 2 Finally,
his opinion considered Williams-Yulee's contention that Florida's interests would be better served through recusal procedures and campaign
finance limitations." 3 Chief Justice Roberts disagreed, asserting that such
recusal rules could shut down some jurisdictions where judges received a
large amount of contributions from lawyers and litigants. Further, he
reasoned that a "flood of postelection recusal motions" could be harmful
to the appearance of judicial impartiality and "thereby exacerbate the
very appearance problem the state is trying to solve."ll 4 Justice Roberts
also expressed concern that recusal procedures could incentivize lawyers
to contribute to judicial campaigns "solely as a means to trigger [a
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 1668.
Id. at 1668-72.
Id. at 1668.
Id. (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 387 (1992)).
Id.
Id. at 1669.
Id. at 1669-70.
Id. at 1670.
Id.
Id. at 1671.
Id.
Id at 1671-72.
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judge's] later recusal" and thereby allow for forum shopping."1 On the
subject of campaign contributions, he reasoned that a state may conclude
that small contributions can affect the appearance of judicial impartiality
just as significantly as large ones.
D. Justice Breyer's Concurring Opinion
Justice Breyer's short concurrence expressed his view that the scrutiny levels applied by the Court in various contexts should be viewed as
guidelines rather than strict rules.l 17 He cited previous cases where he
8
voiced this position but did not provide any additional reasoning."
E. Justice Ginsburg's Concurring Opinion
Justice Ginsburg wrote a separate opinion in response to Part 11119 of
the majority opinion to express her view that strict scrutiny should not be
applied to state actions regulating speech in judicial elections.120 She
reasoned that judges are different from politicians and that rules regulating other political elections should not be applied to judicial elections.121
She held that while recent Court decisions, such as Citizens United, have
greatly increased the potential for "monied interests . . . 'in representative
politics,"' such judgments should not apply to judicial elections because
judges are "not 'expected to be responsive to [the] concerns' of constituents." 22 Further, Justice Ginsburg argued that applying the standards of
other elections to judicial elections blurs the distinction between judges
and politicians, citing how unbridled spending in judicial elections has
"threaten[ed] both the appearance and actuality of judicial independence." 1 23 She concluded that states should be allowed to balance the interest of having an impartial judiciary free of improper financial influence with the constitutional interest in freedom of speech.1 24

115.
116.
117.

Id. at 1672.
Id.
Id. at 1673 (Breyer, J., concurring).

Id. Justice Breyer's opinion reads as follows:
118.
As I have previously said, I view this Court's doctrine referring to tiers of scrutiny as
guidelines informing our approach to the case at hand, not tests to be mechanically ap-

-,
132 S.Ct. 2537, 2551plied. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. -,
2553, 183 L.Ed.2d 574 (2012) (BREYER, J., concurring in judgment); Nixon v. Shrink
Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 400-403, 120 S.Ct. 897, 145 L.Ed.2d 886
(2000) (BREYER, J., concurring). On that understanding, I join the Court's opinion.

Id.
119.
Part II of the majority opinion held Canon 7C(1) must survive strict scrutiny analysis if it
is to be held constitutional under the First Amendment. See id. at 1664-65 (majority opinion).

120.
121.
122.

Id. at 1673 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 1673-74 (second alteration in original) (first quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S.

93, 297 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); then quoting McCutcheon v.

FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014)).
123.
Id. at 1674-75.
124. Id. at 1675.
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F. Justice Scalia'sDissenting Opinion
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, authored the first dissent.1 2 5 He began by stating that all speech is fully protected under the
First Amendment unless there is a longstanding tradition of regulating
the speech at issue and that there is no such history pertaining to judicial
campaign speech. 12 6 Justice Scalia then argued that, while Florida likely
has a compelling interest in maintaining the appearance of judicial impartiality, Canon 7C(l) is not narrowly tailored to address Florida's interest.127 He stated that Florida's definition of its interest in the "public
confidence in judicial integrity" is vague and that the Court ignores aspects of that interest throughout its opinion when addressing other forms
of judicial speech, such as committee solicitation and personal thank-you
notes.1 28

Justice Scalia moved on to conclude that Florida did not meet its
burden of demonstrating that personal solicitation by judicial candidates
significantly diminishes the public's trust in the judiciary.1 29 Further, he
argued that our nation's long history of judicial elections allowing personal solicitations suggests that such speech does not trouble the publiC. 130 Next, Justice Scalia argued that Canon 7C(1) is vastly overinclusive because the canon unnecessarily bans all personal solicitation, even
those that do not threaten the public's confidence in the integrity of the
judiciary, such as the mass mailing at issue.1 3 1 Further, he argued that
Canon 7C(1) fails to prohibit all personal solicitations by judicial candidates, pointing out that judges are not prohibited from asking for personal gifts from campaign supporters.132 Justice Scalia went on to state that
the First Amendment prohibits the abridgment of speech based on its
content and that the Court's opinion violates this principle by prohibiting
personal campaign solicitations by judges but not personal solicitation by
judges for other purposes.' 33 He concluded that the true motivation behind Canon 7C(l) appears to be a general hostility towards judicial elections. 134

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

(Scalia, J., dissenting).
at 1676.
at 1676-77.
at 1677-78 (quoting id. at 1666 (majority opinion)).
at 1678-79 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
at 1678.
at 1679.
at 1680.
at 1681.

134.
Id. at 1681-82 ("Canon 7C(l)'s scope suggests that it has nothing to do with the appearances created by judges' [sic] asking for money, and everything to do with hostility toward judicial
campaigning. How else to explain the Florida Supreme Court's decision to ban all personal appeals
for campaign funds (even when the solicitee could never appear before the candidate), but to tolerate
appeals for other kinds of funds (even when the solicitee will surely appear before the candidate)? It
should come as no surprise that the ABA, whose model rules the Florida Supreme Court followed

when framing Canon 7C(l), opposes judicial elections. . . .").
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G. Justice Kennedy's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Kennedy argued that the Court's opinion is based on the
premise that "the public lacks the necessary judgment to make an informed choice" in judicial elections and that judicial elections should be
regulated differently than other political elections because of the special
nature of judges.' 35 While he admitted that Florida may have a compelling interest in protecting the appearance and reality of judicial integrity,
Justice Kennedy argued that this interest does not trump basic First
Amendment principles.' 36 He gave an example of how a qualified but
underfunded and less well-known judicial candidate could suffer a severe
disadvantage in an election and argued that the canon effectively curtails
beneficial debate in the public sphere where a candidate cannot get his
message out.1 3 7 Justice Kennedy also stated that the Court's opinion
greatly weakens the strict scrutiny standard by creating precedent to undermine it, describing the opinion as a "guide to eviscerating strict scrutiny any time the Court encounters speech it dislikes." 38
H. Justice Alito's DissentingOpinion
Justice Alito stated that he largely agreed with the analyses of Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy.1 39 He expressed his view that, while
Florida has a compelling interest in maintaining the impartiality and integrity of the judiciary, Canon 7C(l) "is not narrowly tailored to serve
that interest." 40 Like Justice Scalia, he pointed out that the Canon restricts forms of speech that do not threaten judicial integrity or the public's perception of it.141 Further, he echoed Justice Kennedy's concern
that the majority opinion weakens strict scrutiny by providing such a
poor analysis of when a law is "narrowly tailored." 1 4 2
III. ANALYSIS

In Williams-Yulee, the Court went against the trend established by
White and Citizens United by identifying an area where the scope of First
Amendment protections is not the same in judicial elections as it is in
other elections. 143 By ruling that states can prevent judicial candidates

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 1683 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 1683-85.
Id. at 1685.
Id. (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 312 (2010) (holding that a federal statute

barring independent corporate expenditures for electioneering communications violated the First

Amendment); Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002) (holding that Minnesota's restriction on judicial candidates announcing their views is a violation of the First Amendment).
Williams-Yulee, however, held that Florida's restriction on direct campaign fund solicitation by
judicial candidates was not a violation of the First Amendment. 135 S. Ct. at 1666.

566

DENVER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:2

from personally soliciting campaign funds, the Court withheld a right
from judicial candidates that their legislative and executive counterparts
enjoy.'" In so ruling, the Court justified its decision primarily on the
notion that judges serve a different function than politicians and that difference allows judicial elections to be regulated differently than other
elections.145

This analysis will first argue that, ideally, judges should serve a different role than politicians, but judicial elections cause judges to behave
very similarly to politicians. Next, this part will consider how best to
achieve the ideals of judicial impartiality and independence by addressing speech restrictions and recusal procedures.1 4 6 This part also will argue that the Court's decision in Williams-Yulee is undesirable because
judicial impartiality should not come at the expense of fundamental First
Amendment principles. Finally, this part will suggest that the best way to
ensure judicial impartiality is to encourage states to get rid of their judicial election systems and to adopt lifetime judicial appointment regimes.
144.
See Lauren Garcia, Note, CurbingCorruption or Campaign Contributions? The Ambiguous Prosecution of "Implicit" Quid Pro Quos Under the FederalFunds Bribery Statute, 65 Rutgers

L. Rev. 229, 230 (2012) ("American election campaigns and political platforms have historically
been privately funded; public officials have an interest in soliciting contributions in order to represent and serve their constituents.").

145.

See Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1667.

146.

This Comment will not address merit selection-also known as the Missouri Plan. See

James Bopp, Jr., The Perils ofMerit Selection, 46 IND. L. REV. 87, 92 (2013). While this method of
judicial selection varies amongst the states that have adopted it, the process usually involves judicial
appointment by the state's governor from a list of candidates selected by a judicial vacancy commission. Id. After serving on the bench for a period of time, the judge's performance is evaluated by a
retention election where voters decide whether the judge should be retained. Dimino, supra note 1, at
374 n.436. Proponents of merit selection maintain that merit selection eliminates much of "the
influence of campaign contributions" in judicial elections. Bopp, supra, at 93. However, there is
evidence that retention elections have become increasingly politicized, and spending has increased in
retention elections dramatically. See Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1674-75 (Ginsberg, J., concurring); BILLY CORRIHER, MERIT SELECTION AND RETENTION ELECTIONS KEEP JUDGES OUT OF
POLITICS
1
n.7
(2012),
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/11 /JudicialElectionsPart3-C4-2.pdf. These facts suggest that merit selection
systems, while arguably a better system than contested elections, may now suffer from some of the
same impartiality issues as contested elections, although likely to a much lesser degree.
Another potential solution that is beyond the scope of this Comment is public financing

for judicial candidates. Public financing-first adopted by North Carolina in 2002-is a system
where states offer public money to judicial candidates in order to lessen the need for solicitation of
private campaign money. Gaylord, supra note 41, at 1543. While this method is a promising solution
in theory to the issues ofjudicial impartiality created judicial elections, the viability of public financing took a hit after the Court's ruling in Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC v.

Bennett. See 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2813 (2011). Arizona's "matching funds" provision allowed a candidate to receive additional campaign money to match a privately funded candidate's fundraising when
the privately funded candidate's campaign expenditures exceeded the initial amount granted to
publicly funded candidates. Id The Court ruled the provision was unconstitutional because it imposed an impermissible penalty on candidates who choose to "robustly exercise[] [their] First

Amendment right[s]." Id at 2818 (third alteration in original) (quoting Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724,
739 (2008)). Further, the Court held Arizona's rule violated the First Amendment by incorporating
independent expenditures made by third parties in calculating if the privately funded candidate had

exceeded the public spending cap. Id. at 2819. By eliminating the option of "matching funds," the
Court took away many candidates' incentive to rely on public financing, since use of state funds
usually comes with restrictions on how the money can be used and how much private money a
candidate can raise in addition. Gaylord, supra note 41, at 1543-44, 1548.
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However, such sweeping adoption of the federal system is politically
unlikely.
Therefore, this part will conclude that pursuing more rigorous and automatic recusal procedures may be the only politically feasible
way of solving at least some of the impartiality problems posed by judicial elections.
A. JudicialElections Compromise the Role of the Judiciary

'

In the opinion of the Court, Chief Justice Roberts stated that
"[j]udges are not politicians," and, unlike politicians, judges are not supposed to be responsive to the desires of their supporters and financial
contributors in the performance of their duties.148 Judges are to "'observe
the utmost fairness,' striving to be 'perfectly and completely independent, with nothing to influence or [control them] but God and [their] conscience."' 1 49 Recognizing the unique role of judges, the Founders were
correct to enshrine a mechanism in the Constitution to protect judicial
independence and impartiality. The proper function of society depends
on a fair and balanced judiciary, and the public must perceive the judiciary as being fair and balanced to honor its rulings.150 Without a properly
functioning judiciary, people may begin to lose faith in the courts as administrators of justice and could resort to "violent, extralegal and possibly criminal practices" to resolve their disputes.' 5
What assures a fair and balanced judiciary in Article III is a judicial
appointment system where judges serve for life "during good Behaviour
[sic]." 52 Life appointment allows judges to be unconcerned with public
opinion, financial contributors, or "congressional or presidential reaction
to any particular ruling."' 3 In theory, this allows judges to apply the law
to the facts presented to them without feeling beholden to any special
interest or pressure.
The idea of perfect judicial impartiality, even in an appointment
system like that of the federal government's, is never completely attainable. Judges are human beings, and like all other human beings, they harbor some biases based on their personal experiences and beliefs. 5 4 But

147.
148.

See infra Section III.E.
Williams- Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1662, 1667.

149.
Id. at 1667 (quoting Address of John Marshall, in PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE
VIRGINIA STATE CONVENTION OF 1829-1830, at 616 (1830)).
150.
Norman L. Greene, How Greatis America's Tolerancefor Judicial Bias? An Inquiry into
the Supreme Court's Decisions in Caperton and Citizens United, Their Implicationsfor Judicial
Elections, and Their Effect on the Rule of Law in the UnitedStates, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 873, 884-85

(2010).
151.

Okechukwu Oko, Seeking Justice in Transitional Societies: An Analysis of the Problems

and Failuresof the Judiciaryin Nigeria, 31 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 9, 19 (2005).
152. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
153.
Dimino, supra note 1, at 306.
154.
See LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927-1960, at 6-7 (1986) (emphasizing
how legal realists believe judicial "idiosyncrasy," such as a judges political, social, and economic
views, can subconsciously affect judicial decision-making).
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this degree of impartiality is acceptable so long as a judge applies the law
based on what he or she believes the appropriate and just result should
be. What is undesirable, however, is a judge who rules not based on his
or her own understanding of the law or justice but rather in response to
outside pressures from members of the public and financial contributors
who desire a particular result regardless of what the law is or should be.
Unfortunately, the latter behavior is inevitable under a system where
voters elect judges, which in effect requires judges to behave just like
other politicians who respond to the electorate and their financial supporters in the performance of their duties.' 55
Few people would be impervious to the fact that they may lose their
job when they are accountable to the public and the public is dissatisfied
with their decisions. 15 Indeed, the influence of public opinion on the
decisions of an elected judge has been likened to "a crocodile in your
bathtub ... [y]ou know it's there, and you try not to think about it, but
it's hard to think about much else while you're shaving."' 57 Similarly, a
judge cannot help but feel the pressure of ruling in favor of a financial
contributor to his or her campaign when that contributor appears before
them in court. 15 Even if they were able to resist that pressure, the appearance of impartiality and justice can nonetheless be diminished in the
eyes of the public.1 59 Thus, judicial elections create a serious problem for
states that have adopted them but nonetheless wish to preserve the impartiality of their judiciary.
Some commentators have suggested that states chose judicial elections over judicial appointment systems because these states value democracy and accountability to the public over the appearance and actuality of judicial impartiality and independence.' 60 Indeed, accountability
155.
See Dimino, supra note 1, at 348. Studies have shown that independent judicial decisionmaking is compromised when judges are elected: "[J]udges, just like other politicians, tailor their
decisionmaking to the necessities of campaigns, changing their behavior in response to the expected
reaction of the electorate." Id. at 347-48; see also CHRIS W. BONNEAU, THE FEDERALIST Soc'Y, A
SURVEY OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE CONCERNING JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 7 (2012), http://www.fedsoc.org/library/doclib/20120719_Bonneau2Ol2WP.pdf ("[T]he evidence is pretty clear that elected
judges are responsive to their constituencies when it comes time to make decisions on the bench.").

156.

See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 789 (2002) (O'Connor, J., concur-

ring) ("Elected judges cannot help being aware that if the public is not satisfied with the outcome of
a particular case, it could hurt their reelection prospects.").
157.
Gerald F. Uelmen, Crocodiles in the Bathtub: Maintaining the Independence of State
Supreme Courts in an Era of Judicial Politicization, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1133, 1133 (1997)
(paraphrasing the late Honorable Otto Kaus).

158.
159.

See White, 536 U.S. at 790.
Id.

160.

See, e.g., Dimino, supra note 1, at 347; Matthew Schneider, Why Merit Selection of State

Court Judges Lacks Merit, 56 WAYNE L. REV. 609, 621-22 (2010). Caleb Nelson, Professor of Law
at the University of Virginia, has summarized various contemporary and historical opinions on why
states chose judicial elections throughout the mid-1800s. Caleb Nelson, A Re-Evaluation ofScholarly Explanationsfor the Rise of the Elective Judiciaryin Antebellum America, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
190, 190-91 (1993). He notes that most scholars suggest the transition occurred as part of a wave of
populist support for democracy. Id.; see also White, 536 U.S. at 791 ("[B]eginning with Georgia in
1812, States began adopting systems for judicial elections. From the 1830's until the 1850's, as part
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plays an important role in the other branches of government, but to demand the judiciary be accountable to the public undermines the purpose
of having an independent judiciary.' Elected judicial figures become
politicians subject to the influence of the public and can fail to fulfill
their role as a check on the other branches and protector of minority
rights from a potentially tyrannical majority.1 62
B. The Court Should Not Abridge FirstAmendment Principles to Achieve
JudicialImpartialityand Independence
Despite the threats to judicial independence and impartiality created
by judicial elections, a majority of states today have judicial elections in
some form or fashion.' 63 In an attempt to protect the appearance and reality of judicial impartiality, many states have sought to regulate judicial
speech during campaigns in an effort to eliminate some of the pressure
created by the electoral process.1"6 While the Court in White weakened
the scope of what speech states can regulate,' 65 in Williams-Yulee the
Court upheld restrictions on judicial campaign speech in service of maintaining judicial independence and impartiality.1 66 The Court's support of
Florida's interest in judicial impartiality in Williams-Yulee is admirable;
however, the means chosen to preserve that interest are troubling. By
prohibiting personal solicitation of campaign funds by judicial candidates, the Court weakens the power of the First Amendment right to free
speech in an area that right is supposed to be at its most powerful.1 67
In Williams-Yulee, the majority justifies the abridgement of judicial
candidates' speech on the notion that judges are not like politicians, and
this difference justifies regulating judicial elections differently than other
elections.'6 8 In so doing, the majority implicitly emphasizes the distinction between judge, or potential judge, and candidate, suggesting that
one's status as a judge, or one's pursuit of that status, "condition[s] the
exercise of free speech" in a judicial election.' 69 Indeed, the Court holds

of the Jacksonian movement toward greater popular control of public office, this trend accelerated..
. ." (citation omitted)).
161.
See generally Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciariesand the

Rule ofLaw, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689 (1995) (discussing the importance of an independent judiciary
in maintaining constitutional safeguards for minority rights and the dangers an elected judiciary
poses to that role).

162.
163.

See id at 727.
Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1662 (2015).

164.

See Dimino, supra note 1, at 314.

165.

Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 787-88 (2002) (holding that Minneso-

ta's "announce clause" was a violation of the First Amendment).

166.
167.
168.

Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1673.
See id. at 1682-83 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1662 (majority opinion).

BRIAN K. PINAIRE, THE CONSTITUTION OF ELECTORAL SPEECH LAW: THE SUPREME
169.
COURT AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN CAMPAIGNS AND ELECTIONS 73 (2008) (explaining that
the judge/candidate distinction was relied upon by the dissenting justices in While). Many of the
same arguments offered by the dissent in White are offered in Williams-Yulee by the majority.
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70
judges to different First Amendment standards than ordinary citizens.1
Judges are currently prevented from endorsing political candidates, soliciting charitable contributions, and participating in certain organizations,
all of which are speech restrictions justified in the name of preserving
judicial "dignity, integrity, and impartiality."' 7 ' While not all judicial
candidates are governmental "employees," one might argue that judicial
candidates are "similarly situated" to governmental employees and that
content-based restrictions on their speech are justified to protect judicial
impartiality.1 7 2

While one might consider the restrictions on judicial and government employees' speech to be violations of the First Amendment,' 73 the
fundamental issue with comparing content-based speech restrictions imposed on sitting judges and those imposed on judicial candidates is that
judicial candidates are candidates in an election first, and judges, or potential judges, second.1 74 Speech restrictions of the kind addressed in
Williams-Yulee do not "restrict the speech of judges because they are
judges," but rather "regulate the content of candidate speech merely beAnd while judges are not afforded
cause the speakers are candidates."
in
their
capacity as government emprotection
full First Amendment
ployees, candidates in elections should be granted the full protective
force of the First Amendment. 7 6
As mentioned previously, the First Amendment provides special
protection for political speech because of its importance to the democratic process.1 7 7 Candidate speech is a form of political speech and is at the
heart of the primary justification for the First Amendment: selfgovernance.' 78 Under the self-governance theory, candidate speech is
protected because it is essential for voters to make informed decisions on
79
which candidate to vote for.
170.
Charles Gardner Geyh, The Jekyll and Hyde of FirstAmendment Limits on the Regulation
ofJudicial Campaign Speech, 68 VAND. L. REv. EN BANC 83, 93 (2015); see also Garcetti v. Ce-

ballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (holding that government employee speech is not protected by the
First Amendment when an employee makes a statement pursuant to his or her official duties).
171.
Geyh, supra note 169, at 93; see also Rodney A. Smolla, Regulatingthe Speech ofJudges
andLawyers: The First Amendment and the Soul of the Profession, 66 FLA. L. REV. 961, 971 (2014)
("Judges, of course, are government employees, and fall under the government employee rule established in Garcettiv. Ceballos.").

172.

Geyh, supra note 171, at 94-95.

173.

This issue, while interesting, is beyond the scope of this Comment.

174.

See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1682-83 (2015) (Kennedy, J., dissent-

ing) (emphasizing a judicial candidate's status as a candidate in an election); Republican Party of

Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 796 (2002) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
White, 536 U.S. at 796 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
175.
176. See Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1682-83 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
177.

See supra Section L.A.

178.

See supra Section IA; see also Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir. 2002)

("A candidate's speech during an election campaign 'occupies the core of the protection afforded by

the First Amendment."' (quoting McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 346 (1995))).
179.
Buckley v. Valco, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976) ("In a republic where the people are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make informed choices among candidates for office is essential,
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Applying these principles to the facts of Williams-Yulee, the majority, in allowing states to prohibit judges from directly soliciting campaign
funds from the public, has regulated political speech that is important for
self-governance and democracy. While asking for money may not seem
particularly significant to self-governance, "[w]hen a candidate asks
someone for a campaign contribution, he tends ... also to talk about his
qualifications for office and his views on public issues.,"s Certainly,
judicial candidates have other ways of communicating their qualifications and views to voters, but a ban on direct campaign fund solicitation
eliminates one important context in which those views can be communicated.' 8 ' Further, restricting a judicial candidate's ability to directly solicit campaign funds inhibits the ability of "low profile" challengers to raise
money and prevents them from reaching the public to the same extent as
other candidates. 82 The result is a "dead weight" on public debate-the
sort of weight the First Amendment is designed to prevent.1 83
While the Court in Williams-Yulee justifies the abridgement of
speech as serving the ends of judicial impartiality and independence,' 84
those interests simply do not trump the importance of preserving the First
Amendment right to freedom of speech for electoral candidates. As Justice Kennedy stated in White, "restrictions on political speech are 'expressly and positively forbidden by' the First Amendment."'8 5 Simply
put, once a State has chosen to hold judicial elections, "the First
Amendment protects the candidate's right to speak and the public's ensuing right to open and robust debate,"' 86 and "[t]he State cannot opt for an
elected judiciary and then assert that its democracy, in order to work as
desired, compels the abridgment of speech."' 87 The importance of maintaining free discourse and open debate in elections throughout our society is simply too great to be overcome by the interest of judicial impartial-
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ity.1' Thus, Williams-Yulee provides the wrong way of solving the problem of judicial impartiality. The decision solves that problem only marginally while undermining one of the fundamental justifications for the
First Amendment.
C. Recusal as a Speech-ProtectingOption in MaintainingJudicialImpartiality
In her argument to the Court, Williams-Yulee suggested that Florida
could preserve its interest in judicial impartiality through recusal procedures.'8 Williams-Yulee is not alone in this contention; many commentators have suggested that recusal procedures offer a viable solution to
the inherent tension between judicial elections and judicial impartiality.1 90 In his concurring opinion in White, Justice Kennedy reasoned that
states concerned over judicial impartiality "may adopt recusal standards
more rigorous than due process requires, and censure judges who violate
these standards."' 9' However, the Court rejected Williams-Yulee's argument, reasoning that recusal procedures could overwhelm some jurisdictions, exacerbate concerns over the appearance of impartiality, and
incentivize lawyers to donate to judicial campaigns for the sole purpose
of triggering recusal.1 92
The majority opinion in Williams-Yulee is correct to hold that current recusal procedures are inadequate protections of judicial impartiality. 193 In Caperton, the Court established that the Constitution only requires judicial recusal in extreme cases where the "probability of bias" is
overwhelming.1 94 As previously mentioned, 95 the current ABA Model
Code of Judicial Conduct suggests that judges should recuse themselves
when they know a party or their attorney donated money to their campaign,' 96 but numerous states have not adopted this provision.' 97 These
facts indicate that judges are not required to recuse themselves when
confronted by campaign contributors in almost all cases. Further, the
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most serious problem with recusal procedures as they exist now is that
the procedures ask judges to recuse themselves.
Recusals currently occur either when judges recuse themselves for
meeting one of their state's recusal conditions or when litigants file a
motion to disqualify a judge.1 98 In the latter scenario, the challenged
judge determines whether to accept or deny the motion.1 99 Either way,
judges end up evaluating their own impartiality. The problem with this
system is that judges are typically inclined to determine that they are not
biased and are fully capable of overseeing the litigation in an impartial
manner. 20 This method could be problematic, and studies on judicial
bias suggest that these self-determinations may not be accurate since
judges often rule in favor of their campaign contributors. 20 1 Further, litigants can be hesitant to file a motion to disqualify a judge, fearing that
the judge will take offense and disadvantage them throughout the rest of
202
Thus, current recusal procedures are weak shields
the proceedings.
against the threat campaign contributions pose to judicial impartiality.
Commentators have suggested numerous revisions to the current
recusal standards in an effort to alleviate the concerns raised by cam203
In particular, states could create rules that considpaign contributions.
er the dollar amount or percentage of total contributions a donor makes
to a judicial campaign, the time the donation was made, and the motivations surrounding the donor's contributions in determining when a judge
should recuse himself or herself.204 While such rules may provide some
benefit in combating contributor threats to judicial impartiality, they do
not address the underlying issue that judges evaluate themselves in
recusal proceedings.
Of course, a possible solution to this issue would be to have other
judges review recusal proceedings, but this procedure is not without its
own problems. For one, appellate judges do not typically overrule recusal
denials because judges do not like "investigating and ruling on the integrity of fellow judges and [often] do not look favorably on litigants who
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question the integrity of the court." 20 5 These sentiments likely would be
shared by lower-court judges reviewing the denied recusal motions of
their peers. And with the dockets of many jurisdictions overflowing with
cases, other judges may simply defer to the judgment of their peers for
206
the sake of efficiency.
Finally, states could impose automatic judicial disqualifications under certain circumstances when a party who donated to a judge's campaign appears before that judge in court. States could consider the dollar
amount contributed by an individual or organization, as well as the proportion of that donation in relation to the judge's total campaign expendi207
tures, and place a defined limit on one or both.
Such procedures would
eliminate the issue of having judges evaluate their own impartiality and
would not require third party judges to intervene either. One criticism of
automatic recusals offered by Justice Roberts in Williams-Yulee is that
some jurisdictions could run into problems if certain donors contribute to
numerous judges' campaigns, and a situation could arise where a court
could not try a party because every available judge would have to recuse
themselves. 208 However, such situations are unlikely to occur often, and
jurisdictions could create measures to override automatic recusals in such
circumstances-perhaps by selecting the judge who benefited the least
from that individual or group's contribution.
D. The Best Way to PreserveJudicialImpartiality andIndependence Is
to Advocate for Lifetime JudicialAppointment, but Politics Gets in the
Way
Even assuming that it is permissible to censor judicial speech in
some circumstances, as the Court did in Williams-Yulee, no amount of
speech abridgement will solve the underlying issues of judicial bias created by judicial election. As Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissent, the
Florida canon addresses one small area where the appearance and reality
of judicial impartiality could be compromised. 209 Even if conduct rules
forbid judges from making any statements during their elections, they
would still be subject to pressure from public scrutiny of their decisions.2 10 No restriction on judicial campaign speech can mitigate this
basic fact of judicial elections. Similarly, state-created recusal procedures, while arguably a better approach to preserving judicial integrity
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than restricting campaign speech,21 1 fail to eliminate public pressure on
judicial decision-making. Recusals can ease the burden placed on judges
when confronted with campaign contributors in their courtrooms, but the
underlying pressure of public approval still looms in the background of
any decision made by an elected judge.2 12
Having concluded that speech should not be abridged in any election and that recusal procedures cannot fully preserve judicial impartiality and independence, the best option to preserve judicial impartiality and
independence is to advocate for the end of judicial elections and the
adoption of lifetime judicial appointments. The integrity of elections in
this country must be preserved, but the existence of judicial elections
need not be. By adopting appointment systems like that of the federal
government's, state governments can free their judiciaries from the pressures of the public and financial supporters and ensure the impartiality
and independence of their judiciaries without compromising the interest
213
of free speech in elections.
The problem with advocating for states to model the federal system
of judicial appointment is that, in the current political climate, widespread and sweeping reform in this direction appears to be virtually impossible. For one, neither the Supreme Court nor Congress can compel
states to end judicial elections. Further, judicial elections remain popular
amongst voters214 despite the fact that voters acknowledge that campaign
contributions influence judicial decision-making.2 15 Recently, activists
have aimed their reform efforts at implementing merit selection,216 and
voters have met even this movement with considerable resistance. 217 In
fact, much of the legislative action in 2015 amongst states that already
employ merit selection has been aimed at either substantially reforming
merit selection or abolishing it altogether.2 1 8
What, then, can concerned parties do to preserve both judicial independence and impartiality? Implementing automatic recusal rules is the
second-best option for maintaining judicial impartiality after state adoption of the federal system, but implementing such measures would not be
211.
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without its own problems. In particular, state courts may be resistant to
legislative action requiring judicial recusal in certain circumstances as a
violation of separation of powers, and courts could even strike down
recusal measures implemented by state legislatures.2 1 9 Thus, it will likely
fall upon state courts to implement additional recusal standards, and most
states have been slow to implement more stringent recusal rules postCaperton.220 And, as mentioned above, judicial recusal does nothing to
solve the fundamental problems judicial elections pose to judicial independence. So long as there are judicial elections, true judicial independence cannot be achieved. However, since solving some problems is better
than solving none, maintaining judicial impartiality by way of automatic
recusal standards would be a step in the right direction.
CONCLUSION

The Williams-Yulee decision is an attempt by the Court to cure
some of the ills of judicial elections, and those ills undoubtedly need to
be remedied. However, the Court created an even bigger problem by
abridging judicial candidates' freedom of speech. While the Court may
wish to help states in their efforts to preserve judicial impartiality, once a
state has opted to hold judicial elections, it must suffer the full consequences of that decision regardless of the problems those elections create. Those states have "voluntarily taken on the risks [of] judicial bias,"221 and the only way to eliminate those risks is for that state to get rid
of judicial elections.
The better way to preserve judicial impartiality and independence is
to advocate for states to model the federal system of judicial selection.
However, this solution is infeasible in the current political climate, so the
Court, the ABA, and the public should instead encourage states to implement automatic recusal rules in particular situations. Automatic
recusal procedures cannot completely remedy the threats posed to judicial independence by contested elections, but in a world of political second-bests, such solutions will have to do for the time being.
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